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Convergence: Are  
the Eurozone countries 
too different?
The Eurozone countries are economically different. The crisis has rendered some  
of these differences more acute and this could destabilize the currency union.  
The Eurozone countries therefore need to agree on which type of convergence is 
most important to them and the best way to achieve it. In what areas should they 
converge? What differences could or should remain? And what policy instruments  
are required to achieve this?
Why is the lack of  
convergence in the  
Eurozone a problem?
Convergence 
Convergence is when eco-
nomic conditions, ranging 
from productivity to living 
standards, get closer. The 
economic structures of the 
countries strongly influence 
the extent to which living 
standards may or may not 
converge.
Economic cycle 
The average length of an 
economic cycle from boom 
to recession is approximate-
ly five years. If the phases in 
the different euro countries 
fall out of sync, the ECB 
must react to upswings and 
downturns at the same time.
Economic differences in the  
Eurozone can be problematic for  
two reasons: First, a common mon-
etary policy requires similar price 
developments so that the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) interest rate 
suits all the countries in question. 
Second, the trust that consumers and 
the markets place in the European 
project depends on the euro’s success. 
 Convergence is therefore not only 
an economic but a political issue.
From the start of the common 
currency, there has been too little 
convergence in the Eurozone. Already 
in the first decade, inflation rates 
varied greatly: German inflation, for 
example, was well below the average, 
while in Spain it was well above it. So, 
the ECB’s interest rate was too high for 
Germany and too low for Spain. In 
addition,  economic cycles were not  
synchronized: Spain’s economic  
de velopment clearly fell out of sync 
with that of the others.
The financial and economic crisis 
heightened key differences. While 
Greece, Italy and Spain suffer from 
high unemployment, the jobless 
rate in Germany is lower than it has 
been for a long time. There remain 
significant differences in living 
standards: Greece’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita is around 
30 percent below the EU average, 
while in the Netherlands it is 
approximately 30 percent higher.
Economic imbalances in the Euro- 
zone are hard to correct, as a com- 
parison with the USA demonstrates: 
unlike the US federal government,  
the EU has only a small budget and 
cannot reduce imbalances between 
the states through welfare benefits, 
for example. Furthermore, the EU’s 
Single Market is less integrated than 
its American counterpart: worker 
mobility is low. The EU therefore can- 
not rely on the currency union alone – 
it requires an economic union. 
“The notion of convergence is at the heart of our 
Economic Union: convergence between Member 
States towards the highest levels of prosperity; and 
convergence within European societies, to nurture 
our unique European model.” 
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, 
in the Five Presidents’ Report on 22 June 2015 
“Without reforms […] it is not possible to fight 
unemployment. Everything must come together: 
government support and economic reforms. 
Then Europe has the chance to fulfil its promise 
of prosperity.”
Angela Merkel, German Chancellor,  
in a government statement on 23 November 2016 
How far is the currency 
union already an  
economic one?
From the outset, the Eurozone was 
created as an economic union as 
well. Three elements are especially 
important for economic convergence:
First, the common currency is 
underpinned by regulations. The 
Stability and Growth Pact aims to 
prevent individual countries from 
borrowing too much money, thus 
endangering the sustainability of 
their national debt and – in the long 
term – the Eurozone’s stability as a  
whole. A member state’s deficit may 
not exceed three percent of GDP  
and its debt may not surpass the  
60 percent mark. Public debt, how-
ever, has burst this limit almost 
everywhere. To prevent any future 
accumulation of debt on this scale, 
the requirements have become even 
stricter and now include a debt brake 
that has to be anchored in the  
national constitution.
Second, the EU budget plays an 
important role for convergence. The 
convergence of living standards has 
become increasingly important in 
the distribution of spending. For the 
period between 2014 and 2020, the 
EU has a budget of around 638 bil- 
lion euro. During this period, it will  
allocate more than a quarter of this 
to specific measures for education 
and training, better working condi-
tions and the fight against poverty.
Third, new convergence instruments 
were introduced after the crisis, in-
cluding the so-called  Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure. As well as moni- 
toring budget deficits and debt, other 
indicators are now also watched 
carefully so that imbalances can be 
recognized and corrected earlier. 
Country-specific recommendations 
are intended to advance national  
 structural reforms and generate  
more convergence. 
Despite these efforts, differences 
between the countries persist. Owing 
to continuingly high levels of debt, 
structural reforms are the only way 
for many Eurozone countries to re-
vive their economies. But it is proving 
difficult to enact such reforms. 
“[W]e need a fully-fledged EU-policy on youth. 
While we have been able to steadily decrease youth 
unemployment since it reached its peak in 2013,  
divergences remain huge in EU Member States.” 
Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, 
in a speech to the European Council on 15 December 2016 
“There are many understandable political 
reasons to delay structural reform, but there 
are few good economic ones. The cost of 
delay is simply too high.” 
Mario Draghi, ECB President, 
at the Brussels Economic Forum on 9 June 2016  
Macroeconomic  
Imbalance Procedure
14 indicators are now 
monitored by the European 
Commission, including 
public and private debt, 
long-term unemployment 
and house price develop-
ment. If dangerous imbal-
ances accumulate, a country 
receives recommendations 
for reform. These must 
be implemented by the 
Eurozone countries on pain 
of sanctions.
Structural reforms
Reforms which impact upon 
the organization of markets 
and the state may lead to 
greater growth and conver-
gence. The European Com- 
 mis sion regularly devises  
country-specific recom men - 
dations. These aim, inter  
alia, at raising the employ-
ment rate, introducing 
more competition in 
individual sectors and 
improving credit condi-
tions for companies. 
CONVERGENCE
 SCENARIO 1 
Doing nothing 
If Eurozone countries prioritize their independent room for manoeu-
vre, differences between them will remain. Economic policy will 
continue to be anchored rather nationally. Each country can pursue 
the economic policy that it thinks suits it best. So no active coordi-
nation takes place and any convergence is simply a by-product of 
economic integration. 
This scenario is challenging for the ECB, however, as national differ-
ences could become even bigger. If a country grows faster than the 
Eurozone average, the ECB’s interest rate will be too low and cannot 
prevent that country’s economy from overheating: more and more 
capital flows into it, wages and prices increase, and competitiveness 
worsens. If, by contrast, a country grows significantly more slowly, 
an excessively high base rate will delay and could even jeopardise its 
economic recovery. 
This scenario therefore brings with it the risk of not only an economic 
but a political crisis: new economic imbalances might arise while an 
effective monetary policy will be impossible if the inflation rates of 
the individual countries continue to diverge. 
 SCENARIO 2 
A federal Europe
The federal solution is based on a stronger EU with more risk and 
sovereignty sharing. The member states coordinate their economic 
policies through a mixture of incentives, sanctions and financial 
and fiscal transfers.
This scenario would entail a sufficient level of convergence in 
the Eurozone. A larger common budget makes up for some of the 
imbalances. Member states are responsible for their own debts but 
issues such as high unemployment may be mitigated by transfer 
payments. The completion of the Single Market, banking union and 
capital market union is on the agenda. If the EU takes on a higher 
degree of responsibility for economic policy, it must democratically 
legitimize this and create the necessary instruments, for example 
by appointing a European Finance Minister.
That said, the EU is still a long way from being a federation. A federal 
Europe means striving towards an “ever closer union”, as outlined 
in the preamble to the European Treaties. However, such a solution 
seems unlikely for now. Hardly any nations are prepared to accept 
fundamental reforms and a further transfer of powers to the European 
authorities.
 SCENARIO 3 
Compromise
Many member states are aware that doing nothing could lead to  
another crisis. However, the grand European project does not enjoy 
the backing of a political majority. Many reforms have been proposed, 
but they remain controversial. For example, further extending the 
Single Market has been met with concerns that market liberalization 
will put pressure on wages and ultimately fail to adequately protect 
individual investment in education. For some, policy instruments to 
combat recession, such as a European Unemployment Insurance, are 
vital but are seen by others as leading to a transfer union in which 
“free-riding” becomes a long-term issue. 
One quid pro quo might be a promising compromise: countries that 
successfully implement reform recommendations gain access to 
compensation mechanisms to help them overcome crises. However, 
such a solution poses the threat that each national government will 
implement a part of its own agenda but the euro will ultimately  
remain unstable. A successful compromise must therefore offer 
more than the sum of individual interests.
“The crisis has shown that a lack of convergence damages all euro-area countries 
economically and politically. It is therefore not hard to see why contributing to con-
vergence is not only in the European but also in the national interest. No country 
makes economic policy for itself alone. This is particularly true for the Eurozone.”  
Dr. Anna auf dem Brinke
The author is a Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin. www.strengthentheeuro.eu
A look 
ahead
340 million people – more than the population of the USA – live in the Eurozone. The four 
largest economies in the Eurozone generate more than three quarters of its GDP. It is there- 
fore particularly important that these four agree on which economic policy to pursue.
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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The economic and social divergence within the Eurozone is particularly reflected in the large 
differences in unemployment. Young people in Italy, Greece and Spain are especially affected, 
with youth unemployment levels reaching between 40 and 50 percent. On the whole, however, 
unemployment in the euro-area countries has been continually falling since 2013.
Source: Eurostat.
Other survey answers include “It would help, but it’s not necessary”,  
“It is not in need of reform” and “I don’t know”.
Source: eupinions, Bertelsmann Stiftung, author’s calculations. The data were collected in the spring of 2016. 
Number of respondents = 10 992.
To what extent, if at all, is the Eurozone or your country in urgent need of economic  
reforms in order to remain politically and economically stable?
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In the publication series “Europa briefing”, the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
and the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin cover key topics of European 
politics and present possible scenarios: What is the problem?  
What might happen next? And what can politics do now? 
You will find all the publications from the joint project here:  
www.strengthentheeuro.eu 
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